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Chapter 43: Testing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda: the case of Afghanistan 
Claire Duncanson and Vanessa Farr1 
 
International military intervention into Afghanistan in 2001 moved rapidly ‘from security 
assistance to full-fledged combat and counter-insurgency’ (Tadjbakhsh 2009, 13), and thus 
comprised warfighting and peacebuilding elements in constant and irreconcilable tension 
(Suhrke 2012). Justifying it under the UN Charter as an act of self-defence in response to the 
9/11 attacks, first the US and UK governments, then the Security Council, used humanitarian 
language to frame their military response. When the United Nations Assistance Mission to 
Afghanistan (UNAMA) was then established in 2002 to support donor coordination and 
peacebuilding, efforts to defeat the Taliban were in full force. Some WPS advocates saw the 
intervention as an opportunity for implementing the new UNSCR 1325, describing it as ‘an 
important litmus test of U.N. and member states’ resolve to integrate women into peace-
building efforts’ (Neuwirth 2002, 253). Yet there was no mention of UNSCR 1325 in any of 
the Resolutions passed by the UNSC on Afghanistan in 2001, even in the creation of UNAMA, 
and gender-just peace remains elusive in Afghanistan.2  This chapter explores the reasons why 
the WPS agenda had such little traction in its first testing ground. First we examine progress 
under the four pillars of the WPS agenda; then we suggest three key interconnected reasons for 
the limited progress. We conclude with suggestions for enhancing women’s security and 
participation in Afghanistan and the WPS agenda more broadly. 
 
I Assessment of Progress under the Four WPS Pillars 
At the time of the military intervention into Afghanistan, UNSCR 1325 merely existed: no 
mechanisms had been set in place for its implementation. Its adoption created obligations 
applicable to all United Nations Member States, including the Governments of the USA, the 
UK and Afghanistan; but these key players were still several years away from developing 
National Action Plans (NAPs) on how to meet these obligations on the ground.3 Given the 
patriarchal extremism of the Taliban regime, women’s organisations, local and international, 
pushed to protect Afghan women from the gendered harms of conflict and encourage their 
participation in efforts to build peace, but implementing the Resolution was a challenge in the 
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face of ongoing militarism and the persistence of Taliban-era decrees restricting women’s 
freedoms (Tadjbakhsh 2009). In this section, we briefly assess this history and its impacts. 
Protection  
Violence and injury, forced displacement and war’s long-term consequences are experienced 
differently by women and men (Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf 2002). Endless war in Afghanistan 
challenges women’s access to the economic, health, education and legal services necessary to 
survive and recover from war’s gendered harms, including sexualised violence, rape, domestic 
violence, trafficking, abduction and forced marriage (Erturk 2005). Eighty-seven per cent of 
women in Afghanistan experience physical, sexual or psychological violence during their 
lifetime, with 62 per cent experiencing multiple forms (UN Women 2017). In her 2005 mission, 
United Nations Special Rapporteur (UNSR) on Violence Against Women, Yakin Ertük (2005), 
concluded that levels of interpersonal violence were ‘dramatic and severe’ and evidence 
suggests the situation has worsened as the political and security situation continues to decline. 
The Afghan Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) reported 2015 as the deadliest year for 
women, with violent crimes including lashing, stoning, and rape (AIHRC 2013). Perpetrators 
are most often family members but, from a feminist perspective, separating ‘private’ from 
‘public’ violence that may be clearly ascribed to ‘war’ is neither possible nor useful: the rise in 
interpersonal violence in contexts of conflict is  enabled by situations of lawlessness and 
militarisation (True 2012, 124–33) and it is often the weaponry provided to men to pursue the 
aims of armed groups that is used to perpetrate domestic violence (Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf 
2002; Farr, Myrttinen, and Schnabel 2009). 
On March 5, 2003, Afghanistan acceded to the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) without reservation. Other protective legal 
frameworks have been adopted since then, including to address the problem of gendered 
violence. In the 2004 constitution, article 22 declares women and men to be equal before the 
law. The National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA), developed under the 
leadership of the Ministry of Women Affairs (MoWA) and ratified by President Karzai in 2007, 
is included as a benchmark in the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), finalised 
in 2008. Yet these advances arguably happened because of women’s on-the-ground activism, 
with UNAMA’s support; they are difficult to ascribe to the WPS agenda. It was not until 2007 
that UNAMA made preambular references to UNSCR 1325, with more concrete references to 
discrimination appearing from 2008 (Tadjbakhsh 2009). Moreover, efforts to put the right to 
equality enshrined in these frameworks into practice are limited (Ayub, Kouvo, and Sooka 
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2009). No comprehensive review identified whether laws prior to it conform to the equal rights 
clause in the 2004 Constitution; as such, these pre-existing laws, which fail to adequately 
protect women and girls from gender-based crimes, often prevail (Ayub, Kouvo, and Sooka 
2009).4 The hard-fought Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) law, passed by 
presidential decree in 2009, was accompanied by dedicated prosecution units, training 
programs for police, prosecutors, judges and lawyers, and legal aid for women (Wimpelmann 
2015). Yet, the consensus is that while it criminalises violence, few mechanisms to identify 
and prosecute perpetrators exist (UNAMA 2013; AREU 2013; Afghan Women’s Network 
2016; Larson 2016). Meanwhile, women’s shelters are under attack and the law is undermined 
by widespread use of mediation rather than adjudication. 
UNSCR 1325 calls for prosecutions and accountability for violence during wartime, yet  there 
has been no ‘transitional justice’ in Afghanistan: indeed, the ‘National Stability and 
Reconciliation’ amnesty law passed by parliament in 2007 disburdened the state from legal 
persecution of war criminals (Ayub, Kouvo, and Sooka 2009). Key international power-
brokers, including the UN, have turned a blind eye to this law for the sake of stability, 
notwithstanding evidence of widespread war crimes including sexualised violence against 
women (Grau 2016, 412).  
If efforts to develop a justice system that works for women have been slow, those to protect 
women and their rights in a more direct way, through the deployment of security personnel, 
have been differently flawed. In 2003, the UNSC voted to expand the NATO-led International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond Kabul with a mandate to protect civilians; but 
observers argue that NATO intensified the conflict through air strikes, ground battles, night 
searches and the like, while escalating the militarization of the country through distributing 
arms and money to militias to battle against Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Kandiyoti 2007b; 
Suhrke 2012). Ultimately, it is civilians who pay for these calculations about potential military 
gains, especially when there is an overall lack of expertise on how to take practical steps to 
dismantle decades-old systems of oppression. For example, while Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (operating between 2006 and 2014), were told to promote gender equality, very few of 
those deployed understood what that meant or knew how to implement anything useful and 
practical (Jones 2009; Azarbaijani-Moghaddam 2014).  
While global attention may have been diverted from the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, 
insecurity continues to worsen, with ever increasing numbers of civilian casualties and massive 
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internal displacement. The total number of civilian deaths increased by 47 per cent between 
2009 and 2015 (UNAMA, 2016, pp. 14–15, 44). In the first nine months of 2016, UNAMA 
documented 8,397 conflict-related civilian casualties (2,562 deaths and 5,835 injured). 1.2 
million people were internally displaced in 2016 alone (Amnesty International 2016). 
Education, healthcare and other basic rights have been severely compromised by this ongoing 
insecurity, reducing life expectancy (Samar 2011). Afghanistan remains amongst the lowest 
ranking countries in the UNDP’s Human Development Index and Gender Development Index 
(169th in both in 2016). The Asia Foundation’s 2016 survey found the national mood to be at a 
record low amid this rising insecurity, civilian deaths and economic challenges (Asia 
Foundation 2016); and 2017 is turning into another deadly year. 
Participation  
In its second pillar, UNSCR 1325 emphasises women’s participation in all aspects of 
peacebuilding. In the various international summits and conferences devoted to discussing 
Afghanistan’s future, however, women were often forgotten, or invited as an afterthought or 
deliberately excluded so as not to anger the Taliban (Cameron and Kamminga 2014). At the 
first Bonn Conference in 2002, only two out of twenty-three Afghans were women (Grenfell 
2004; Heath and Zahedi 2011a). Unsurprisingly, women’s security needs were not reflected in 
the resulting power sharing agreement between the Northern Alliance and the international 
community (Kandiyoti 2007b, 182). By the second Bonn conference in 2011, which aimed to 
plan Afghanistan’s future following international withdrawal in 2014, UNSCR 1325 was a full 
decade old, had been followed by more resolutions aimed at strengthening its goals, attracted 
donor support, and was factored into UN agency emergency and governance responses. Even 
so, it was only after a united outcry that Afghan women were included as participants (Haynes, 
Cahn, and Ni Aolain 2012). More recent summits, such as Brussels in October 2016, the 
Quadrilateral Coordination Group’s 2016 meetings to develop a ‘roadmap to peace,’ and 
2017’s ‘Kabul Process’ have hardly challenged this pattern of exclusion.5 
Turning to women’s participation within Afghanistan, the situation looks more promising. 
Although with significant variations from region to region, women move around more freely, 
and significant advances have been made in enrolling girls in formal education.6 Politically, 
international pressure led to the inclusion of women in the Emergency Loya Jirga of 2002, 
which in turn recommended quotas for women in parliament (Grenfell 2004; Larson 2011).  
There are now more women holding positions of power than at any other time in history: 
twenty-seven per cent of the seats in parliament are held by women, four ministries and the 
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AIHRC are led by women and three women have been appointed as ambassadors (UN Women 
2017). It is still difficult to detect anything of a national women’s movement, however: female 
parliamentarians tend to retain allegiance to political parties or influential individuals, not to 
promote women’s gender interests; there are ongoing tensions between individual women 
parliamentarians, sometimes exacerbated by the donor community; and – crucially – a real 
physical danger of upsetting conservative sensibilities in parliament and other public offices, 
in a context of chronic and highly gendered insecurity (Kandiyoti 2007b; Larson 2011, 2016). 
There are quotas for women’s inclusion in the High Peace Council (HPC), charged with 
overseeing the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP), which aims to persuade 
armed opposition members to disarm and reintegrate into society (UNDP 2011).7 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, some women on the HPC speak for their ethnicity or have ties to the 
Mujahadeen (Henry 2011) while others, who might want to present oppositional views, are 
ignored and side-lined (Lackenbauer and Harriman 2013; Larson 2015).8 President Ghani 
appointed a new female deputy chair and two female advisors to the APRP in February 2016, 
but war also intensified that year: the impacts of their presence cannot easily be assessed.9 
Women are involved in local practices of peacebuilding, but have struggled to impact upon the 
APRP (Quie 2012; Larson 2015).  Nonetheless, NGOs, Afghan and international, continue to  
support this community-level peacebuilding and develop channels for community 
peacebuilders to influence members of the HPC and parliament (Chilvers, Khairkhowa, and 
Morrissey 2016). 
Considerable international effort to increase women’s participation in the security sector – so 
that Afghan women are better able to report crimes and access desperately-needed justice, has 
resulted in tiny advances but communities oppose women working in the security services, 
seeing policing as a disreputable job for an Afghan woman; commanders can be reluctant to 
recruit women; and relatively few women are qualified or drawn to working in a dangerous 
sector in which working conditions are difficult, with discrimination, assault and sexual 
violence commonly aimed at women recruits (Hancock 2013).10  The ANSF have developed a 
recruitment strategy and are conducting training inside and outside the country (Afghan 
Women’s Network 2016), but recruitment of women is likely to remain challenging, especially 
given community opposition. 
Not all suspicion emanates from conservative voices: many feminists question whether an 
increase of women in the security forces should be seen as a measure of success for the WPS 
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agenda (see for example Hudson 2012). Cockburn, for one, has consistently asked whether 
feminists should in fact be “contesting the way the feminist agenda has been recuperated by 
armies justifying the recruitment of more women to the military in reference to Resolution 
1325” (Cockburn 2011). Although Afghanistan represents a compromised space for advancing 
a liberal feminist agenda of inclusion, it is perhaps easier to agree on the advantages of more 
women in the justice system. There is potential for optimism here: in 2014, 10 per cent of 
judges and 22 per cent of lawyers were female (Karlidag 2014: 16).  
An overarching constraint, however, remains the deep insecurity that faces Afghans at every 
turn. Women in public life, whatever their role, are at risk of violence, even murder (Human 
Rights Watch 2009; Amnesty International 2015). Since NATO’s withdrawal in 2014, human 
rights organisations have documented a steady conservative backlash against women’s rights 
and an increase in public threats, intimidation and attacks. It some parts of the country, it 
remains considerably more difficult for girls to access and remain in school than boys. Again, 
with great variations across Afghanistan, the social practice of early marriage is a contributing 
element in the problem that both fertility and maternal mortality rates remain extremely high 
(UNICEF, 2016). Gains made in increasing female literacy may offer some hope of a future 
improvement in this cycle of female suffering, and may in time contribute to more women 
wanting to enter public life – whether at village level or nationally – than at present.  
Prevention  
Afghanistan’s NAP on UNSCR 1325, which itself demonstrates some progress in recent years 
in terms of the participation of women in building peace, interprets prevention work narrowly 
as the deterrence of violence against women. As such, the resolution’s affirmation of ‘the 
important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building’ 
(UNSC 2000) is overlooked; this problem is exacerbated because there are no efforts to 
recognise and tackle the root causes of conflict. In Afghanistan, as we discuss below, this would 
involve recognising the legacies of both Cold War interventions, which include a surplus of 
armaments and a warlord-shaped narcostate, and contemporary economic policies, which 
exacerbate rather than alleviate poverty, inequality, and precarity. The Government of 
Afghanistan may claim to be tackling social grievances to create inclusive and egalitarian 
communities and prevent violent extremism, yet its approach to poverty reduction and 




Relief and Recovery 
Although it is heartening that the Afghan government recognises the need for a gender-
inclusive programme of sustainable development, the ANDS is based on classic neoliberal 
assumptions. At the behest of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), Afghanistan aims 
to ‘ensure sustainable development through a private-sector-led market economy’ (Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan 2008) and focuses on the extraction and exploitation of natural 
resources, agricultural modernization, infrastructural improvement, with an emphasis on 
attracting foreign investment. Observers note that development strategy is “premised on the 
principle that institutions must be put in place to ensure ‘good governance’ in a manner that 
delivers just enough ‘state’ to allow basic security for the functioning of markets and private-
sector-led growth” (Kandiyoti 2007a, 504). This approach has gendered consequences. To take 
natural resource exploitation as an example, few women anywhere benefit from the extractive 
industries; they are unlikely to do so in Afghanistan (Lakhani, Durand, and Noorani 2014; 
Global Witness 2016). Furthermore, a minimalist state in a context of a critical shortage of 
services exacerbates demands made on women as primary carers (Kandiyoti 2007b, 192) but 
it is exceedingly difficult for women to make this point in the absence of a national, inclusive 
and effective women’s movement.12 
ANDS does have gender as a cross-cutting theme, but while the MoWA is mandated to take 
the lead role on monitoring and coordinating the outcome of government interventions for 
gender equality, it is limited by its under-resourced and marginalized position and is powerless 
to conduct regular and meaningful gender impact assessments of IFI and government plans. 
This is a critical failure: feminists have argued for decades that women’s organisations and 
ministries should be able to subject government development plans to scrutiny through gender-
impact assessments (Ni Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn 2011) or gender budgeting initiatives 
(Budlender 2010). NGOs do important work supporting women through small-scale economic 
empowerment projects,13 but there is little space for civil society or international NGOs to 
challenge the overall economic strategy or object to its skewed impacts on women’s well-being 
(AREU 2013) (also see chapter 34 in this Handbook).  
II Challenges to progress 
In this section, we elaborate on what we see as three interconnected and overlapping reasons 
for the limited progress of the WPS agenda in Afghanistan. The first is the fact that the initial 
military intervention was not primarily aimed at peacebuilding, but about US security in the 
reaction to the 9/11 attacks – followed up by a large measure of greed from an international 
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community that benefits from Afghanistan’s war economy. The second is the scale of the 
challenge of implementing WPS in Afghanistan given the context of legacies of decades of 
intervention, counter-intervention and conflict. The third is the sense in which the WPS agenda 
seems ill-suited for the context, because it focuses more on civil and political rights than on the 
inclusive social and economic transformation that women sorely need. 
Self-interested intervention 
Unlike other contemporary military adventures which ignore women altogether, the ‘need’ to 
save suffering women was a major trope in the build-up to intervention and a loudly-expressed 
‘interest’ in their human rights was used as an emotive justification. Both George Bush and 
Tony Blair cynically represented Afghan women as somehow being eager to be drawn further 
into armed violence, making clichéd and hyperbolic claims about how their joint military attack 
on the Taliban would have the ultimate effect of freeing women. This message was pummeled 
home in a special radio broadcast as the build-up to the invasion began in earnest, when Laura 
Bush was put on air to declare that the “fight against terrorism [in Afghanistan] is also a fight 
for the rights and dignity of women” (Bush 2001). 14 In reality, then as now, compromises with 
the Taliban and other conservative armed groups would always receive priority (Ayub and 
Kouvo 2008; Jones 2009; Kandiyoti 2009, 8; Heath and Zahedi 2011b; Haynes, Cahn, and Ni 
Aolain 2012; AREU 2013).   
Meanwhile, observers have seen an increasing state of ‘plunder’ in Afghanistan since the 2001 
invasion. Afghanistan has been the world’s greatest recipient of aid -- $20bn in the first decade 
post-intervention -- but very little reaches the local economy or enables sustainable 
development. The allocation of vast reconstruction funds, totalling billions of dollars, to private 
(international and national) security and construction companies, which are wasteful, 
ineffective or fraudulent, has entrenched a system of corruption (Curtis 2011; Gall 2012, 256–
57; Rohde 2012).15 
The WPS agenda took around a decade to take hold in Afghanistan because the intervening 
powers were, beyond rhetoric, unconcerned with its goals, acting primarily to secure their 
national security and wealth. Donors were not held to account for their promises to Afghan 
women (AREU 2013). Afghanistan offers woeful evidence of all the ways in which the WPS 
agenda remains vulnerable “to co-optation by militarist states and military institutions for 
military purposes” (Cockburn 2011). For many women, an overall decline in their standard of 
living has been the only lasting outcome of ‘Operation Enduring Freedom.’ 
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Legacies of Endless War 
Secondly, the country now runs on an entrenched war economy, largely based in opium 
production and illegal drug trafficking, among other black market activities, from which a few 
warlords are the sole beneficiaries (Kandiyoti 2007b; Loewenstein 2012). Such war economies 
are profoundly gendered with most of the beneficiaries being male; women, with increasing 
levels of hardship the further they are from commercial centres, merely try to survive (Peterson 
2008; Jennings, this volume). Bluntly put, Afghanistan shows how challenging it is to make 
the ideals of the WPS agenda operational in face of an economically, physically and socially 
devastated landscape. 
The gendered effects of Afghanistan’s narco-economy are of particular concern. Afghanistan 
now produces ninety per cent of the world’s heroin, twice as much as in 2000. The cultivation 
of opium benefits the few but causes massive health problems, and the misuse of land and water 
displaces other cultivation: poppy can be cheaper than food. These factors are both causes of, 
and exacerbate, violence against women and their children. In a country with virtually no 
treatment facilities, the number of female addicts continues to rise. Children, fed the drug to 
stave off hunger and fear, are now the largest group of addicts (Whitton 2016).  
Among the other gendered effects of the breakdown of Afghan society is a rise in forced and 
early marriages: men unable to meet their obligations in the drug trade resort increasingly 
to Baad, the practice of exchanging girls or women in marriage to pay a debt or settle a dispute. 
Women in such marriages are often underfed, overworked, depressed, and give birth too young, 
continuing the agonising cycle (Samar 2011). Nonetheless, the international community 
attributes their plight to culture or religion, ignoring “the possibility that what to Western eyes 
looks like ‘tradition’ is, in many instances, the manifestation of new and more brutal forms of 
subjugation of the weak made possible by a commodified criminal economy, total lack of 
security and the erosion of bonds of trust and solidarity that were tested to the limit by war, 
social upheaval and poverty” (Kandiyoti 2009, 2; also see Abu-Lughod 2002; Hirschkind and 
Mahmood 2002).  
Meanwhile, through the ANDS, Afghanistan promotes the policies that further entrench the 
inequalities produced by the war and narco-economies. Thus it is hardly surprising that gains 
made in formal rights – which we argue to have been largely the focus of the WPS agenda to 
date – are ‘condemned to remain dead letters’ in Afghanistan (Kandiyoti 2007b, 185). 
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WPS’s focus on civil and political rights 
The third reason that the WPS agenda has made such little progress in Afghanistan is related 
to this focus on civil and political rights, such as quotas for the participation of women in 
parliament, peace talks, and security sector and the development of legal frameworks to uphold 
women’s rights, especially their right to be free from gender-based violence. Afghan women, 
however, often see themselves as enmeshed in family relationships to the extent that individual 
rights can be less salient (Fluri 2011; Heath and Zahedi 2011b). The focus on marriage and 
children, from which women draw material, as well as social and emotional, resources and 
security (Abirafeh 2009; Grace and Pain 2011), can act to constrain the pursuit of individual 
advantage and desires upon which the international community’s model of peacebuilding, 
including the WPS agenda, are largely premised. Moreover, the WPS agenda, by appearing to 
be concerned with women at the expense of men, has not come across as relevant to all Afghan 
communities (Zahedi 2011). 
Moreover, formal rights for women are arguably only ever translated into progress on the 
ground when there is a strong, coordinated and active women’s movement to hold institutions 
to account, to steer implementation and to continue to advocate for women. Although many 
scholars testify to the resilience of Afghan women (see in particular the contributors to Heath 
and Zahedi 2011), few claim that there was in 2001 an Afghan women’s movement strong 
enough to support effective implementation of the WPS agenda (see for example Billaud 2015). 
This is in part another legacy of the combination of decades of war and patriarchal attitudes 
which deprived many women of education and the ability to move freely outside the home 
(Kandiyoti 2009) but it is also perhaps related to the WPS agenda’s focus on individual civil 
and political rights, which can sometimes seem less relevant than the economic and social 
issues undermining women’s security (Ahmed-Ghosh 2006; Kandiyoti 2007b; Kouvo 2008; 
Burki 2011). Our key point here is that WPS agenda, with its emphasis on civil and political 
rights, has struggled to make inroads into challenging the entrenched war and narco-economies 
and their ongoing legacies that are the root cause of women’s insecurity.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have argued that the impact of the WPS agenda in Afghanistan has 
been limited, due to three main (overlapping) reasons: the self-interested nature of the 
intervening powers, the legacies of decades of conflict in Afghanistan, and the agenda’s 
emphasis on civil and political rights. A key question remains: are the small achievements 
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under the WPS agenda steps upon which more progress for women can be built; or are they too 
marginal to be meaningful, or worse, counterproductive? Whilst there is much to be optimistic 
about in terms of the WPS agenda in general – as evidenced throughout this handbook – 
growing inequality and insecurity in Afghanistan suggests to us that in this particular context, 
efforts to implement UNSCR 1325 have come very close to doing more harm than good 
(Azarbaijani-Moghaddam 2007). The attempts to produce new laws to protect women from 
gender-based violence, and to facilitate their participation in public life, have led to a persistent 
and extremely violent backlash against women (Wimpelmann 2014). The return to Kabul of 
the notorious warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in early May 2017, strikes terror in women 
activists.16 Meanwhile, efforts to mainstream gender into the prevention and relief and recovery 
pillars have been inadequate, leaving entrenched war economies intact and exacerbating 
inequalities. 
That said, there are ways in which WPS advocates can move forward which can build 
on the limited gains we identified in the first section. First, the international community – WPS 
advocates and the UN more generally – has to rethink how it can best support Afghan women. 
Researchers suggest donors must be less prescriptive, think beyond technocratic and project-
based interventions, and be prepared to play a long-term supportive role as facilitators of 
broader mobilization (AREU 2013; Wimpelmann 2014; Larson 2016). Thinking about how to 
support women’s rights in the context of their family relationships, and how to work to 
transform masculinities, will also be important ways forward (Zahedi 2011; AREU 2013). 
Second, the WPS agenda has to pay more attention to economic rights and empowerment.17 
WPS advocates need to advocate for alternative economic models for post-conflict states. As 
well as community level economic empowerment, NGOs need to put pressure on IFIs and the 
donor community to direct the Afghan economy towards job creation, distribution of wealth, 
and sustainable inclusive prosperity. Yet the most urgent task for WPS advocates remains 
oppositional: especially to commitments, made by the government of Afghanistan with 
international diplomatic support, to pursue ‘national security’ with hardline warlords whose 
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